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INCREASING THE INHERENT RISKS OF BASEBALL:
LIABILITY FOR INJURIES ASSOCIATED WITH
HIGH-PERFORMANCE NON-WOOD BATS IN
SANCHEZ V. HILLERICH & BRADSBY CO.I
You'll never see pro baseball with aluminum bats .... They'd
need to put a screen in front of pitchers, put the infielders in the
outfield and move the fans back.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Participation in any sport involves some risk of injury.3 The
goal of decreasing injury risks has sparked important innovations in
sports equipment design. 4 Occasionally, however, innovations have
increased the risk of injury to participants. 5 Where competition be-
1. 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
2. Ned Barnett, Mounds of Opposition: Critics Say Metal Bats Pose Dangers to Pitch-
ers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS: SPORTS DAY (quoting Bill Thurston, Amherst College
baseball coach and former editor for NCAA Baseball Rules Committee), available
at http://apse.dallasnews.com/contest/2000/writing/100-250.enterprise.fourth.
html (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
3. See Gerard T. Noce & Frans J. von Kaenel, Individual and Institutional Liabil-
ity for Injuries Arising from Sports and Athletics: Participants, Coaches, Clubs and Schools
May Incur Liability for Sports-Related Injuries, but Different Standards Apply, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J. 517, 517 (1996) ("Participation in sports is inherently dangerous, and
the risk of injury is manifest. Physical contact is a fundamental and sanctioned
component of many sports."); William Powers, Jr., Sports, Assumption of Risk, and the
New Restatement, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 771, 771 (1999) (noting among risks inherent
in sports competition is risk of other participants' carelessness).
4. See, e.g., David H. Janda, M.D. et al., A Three-Phase Analysis of the Prevention of
Recreational Softball Injuries, 18 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 632 (1990), available at http://
www.ipsm.org/publications/softball-injuries/softball-II.asp (reporting study con-
firming use of quick-release or break-away bases provides means of reducing slid-
ing injuries in baseball and softball which occur during rapid deceleration against
stationary bases); Athletic Mouth Guards, at http://home.flash.net/-dkennel/
guards.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (noting mouth guards prevent oral and fa-
cial injuries during athletic competition, reduce concussion risk caused by blows to
chin, and reduce overall dental trauma).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, United States Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, CPSC Announces Consent Agreement with Manufacturers and Distributors
of Aluminum Baseball Bats (Apr. 13, 1976), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
CPSCPUB/PREREL/prhtml76/76024.html (announcing agreement between
Consumer Products Safety Commission and aluminum bat manufacturers and dis-
tributors addressing hazards associated with aluminum bat grips). In 1975, the
Commission charged that the one-piece rubber grips and knobs of aluminum bats
could deteriorate and separate from the handle, causing the bat to be propelled
during a swinging motion and having the potential for striking a person in near
proximity to the batter. See id.; see also Sean Millar, Injury of the First Metatar-
(77)
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tween sports equipment manufacturers drives innovation in design,
manufacturers owe athletes a duty of care for designs that increase
the safety risks inherent in their sports.6
Major League Baseball has never endorsed the use of alumi-
num and aluminum alloy ("non-wood") bats for its professional ath-
letes. 7 In amateur leagues, young players swing high-performance
non-wood bats, designed to weigh less, produce faster swings, and
drive the ball harder and farther.8 The prospect of enhanced hit-
sophalangeal Joint: Turf Toe, at http://podiatry.curtin.edu.au/encyclopedia/turfL
toe/ (last modified May 10, 1999) (describing "turf toe" as foot injury historically
associated with artificial surfaces). Research indicates artificial surfaces increase
friction; the forefoot becomes fixed due to the high friction surface, and momen-
tum from an external force causes the foot to hyperextend. See id. Artificial sur-
faces gradually become harder and less shock absorbent as they age, also
contributing to risk of player injury. See id.; see also Diana Settles, Prevention of Sports
Injuries: Snow Skiing, at http://siri.uvm.edu/ppt/sportsinj/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2004) (noting in alpine skiing injuries, ski-pole grip using broad superior plate
may cause hyperextension injury to thumb).
6. For a discussion of policy concerns regarding manufacturer liability for
equipment designs that increase risks to players, see infra notes 130-36 and accom-
panying text.
7. See Official Info: Official Rules, 1.10(a), available at http://www.mlb.com/
NASApp/mlb/mlb/officialinfo/official-rules/objectivesil.jsp (last visited Jan.
12, 2004) (requiring wood bats and listing specifications). Paragraph 1.10(a)
states:
The bat shall be a smooth, round stick not more than 2 3/4 inches in
diameter at the thickest part and not more than 42 inches in length. The
bat shall be one piece of solid wood. NOTE: No laminated or experi-
mental bats shall be used in a professional game (either championship
season or exhibition games) until the manufacturer has secured approval
from the Rules Committee of his design and methods of manufacture
Id.; see also Erin E. Floyd, Comment, The Modern Athlete: Natural Athletic Ability or
Technology at Its Best?, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 155, 171 (2002) (noting wood bats
continue to be required by Major League Baseball).
8. See Matt Kelly, M.A. & Paul Pedersen, Ph.D., Editorial, Hardball-Hardbat: A
Call for Change from Aluminum to Wooden Baseball Bats in the NCAA, 4 SPoRTJ. (Sum-
mer 2001), at http://www.thesportjournal.org/2001Journal/Vol4-No3/hard-bats.
asp (summarizing recent design innovations in aluminum bats). The authors
state:
Baseball bat manufacturers, through advances in modem technology,
have been able to create aluminum bats that are lighter in weight than
wooden bats yet still meet the required measurement and size standards.
These lighter bats allow for faster bat speeds during swings that result in
greater hit-ball velocity. Because the ball exits the aluminum bat with a
higher velocity than would a ball from a wooden bat, there is naturally a
greater danger of injury to defensive players.
Id.; see asoJ.J. Trey Crisco, Ph.D. and Rick Greenwald, Ph.D., The Whys and Hows of
Baseball Bat and Ball Regulation: A Scientific Perspective, 2000 NAT'L INST. FOR SPORTS
SCI. & SAFETrv, at http://www.nisss.org/BBSummary-6.8.00.htm (asserting most
compelling reason for regulation of bat performance is possibility of serious injury
to pitchers and fielders from being hit with batted ball). The authors note:
[H]igher performance implies higher batted ball speed, less time to react
to the batted ball, and a greater likelihood of contact. It is obvious that
[Vol. 11: p. 77
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ting and superior durability has made aluminum bats the over-
whelming choice among college and amateur leagues.9 In fact,
many believe these state-of-the-art aluminum bats have changed the
nature of amateur baseball significantly.' 0
Unfortunately, incidents of devastating injuries to young play-
ers, caused by balls sharply batted off of aluminum bats, have be-
come increasingly common." Severe injuries have alarmed
parents, ended young athletic careers, and precipitated legislative
attempts to prohibit the use of non-wood bats by minors.12 Such
increases in contact speed can increase the severity of injury. Further, the
greater the number of high speed hits, the greater the risk of injury.
Id.; see also Press Release, New York City Council Member Jim Oddo, At Bat: The
Safety of Our Kids and One Councilman's Fight to Ban Aluminum and Bring Back
Wood (Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Oddo Press Release] (advocating ban of alumi-
num bat use by minors and describing new generation of aluminum bats and their
startling departure in design from traditional wood counterparts), available at
http://www.nyssf.org/baseballbats.html. Oddo criticized the use of aluminum
bats as follows:
Graphite and aluminum combinations? Bats with pressurized air cham-
bers? Triple wall bats with coiled Springsteel? Bats made of scandium
and other highly advanced materials? Bats developed under a cryogenic
process? Electric bats? Is this baseball? Are these the tools we want in
the hands of our little leaguers and high school athletes? The bats are
becoming lighter, the swings quicker, and the balls are traveling faster
and farther - all with a blatant disregard for the pitcher, or the third
baseman, for that matter.
Id. (quoting Oddo); see also Barnett, supra note 2 (providing design aspects of Hil-
lerich & Bradsby's Louisville Slugger "Air Attack 2" alloy bat). "The bat's thin walls
create a 'trampoline effect' when a ball hits it. To prevent denting, the bat is filled
with pressurized gas." Id.
9. See Barnett, supra note 2 (noting while these young players are allowed to
use wood bats, almost no one does). For a discussion of the prevalence of alumi-
num bat use by amateur teams, see infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Michelle A. Cusimano, Note, National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion Strikes Out Aluminum Bat Manufacturer, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1061, 1069-73
(2000) (describing revolutionary effect non-wood bats have had on nature of col-
lege baseball, including better performance statistics than professional players,
shattered performance records, football game-like scores, injuries to pitchers early
in their careers, repositioning of defensive outfielders, and debate and litigation
between manufacturers and NCAA over bat performance standards).
11. See generally Oddo Press Release, supra note 8 (summarizing recent injuries
and deaths resulting from balls struck by aluminum bats).
12. See Barnett, supra note 2 (quoting parent of high school pitcher who suf-
fered severe head injuries after being hit by ball sharply batted off aluminum bat).
"What disturbed me the most is that [we as parents have] been in the dark about
the equipment these kids are using .. " Id.; see also Mike Vlahovich, Mead Pitcher
Recovering From Line Drive to His Head, SPOKESMAN-REvIEW, Apr. 24, 1997, at N10
(reporting end of local high school pitcher's prospective collegiate athletic career
because of bruise to brain and hearing loss); Oddo Press Release, supra note 8
(introducing bill to ban use of non-wood bats by minors and summarizing ac-
counts of recent injuries and deaths resulting from balls hit off of aluminum bats);
Associated Press, Massachusetts Mulls Ban on Aluminum Bats, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2002, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021031-84246631.htm
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injuries have even prompted the designer of one aluminum bat, the
popular "Air Attack 2" manufactured by Hillerich & Bradsby's Lou-
isville Slugger Division, to a crusade against his own design by peti-
tioning the Consumer Product Safety Commission to recall all
aluminum bats that exceed wood-bat performance standards. 13 Bat
manufacturers have long denied that aluminum bats increase the
risk of injury to players, alleging only anecdotal evidence exists to
(reporting proposed first-in-the-nation ban on aluminum baseball bats in high
school games). In fact, "the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association
took it upon themselves to prohibit the use of non-wood bats in the state high
school baseball tournament this spring to be followed by an entire season of wood-
only use in 2004." Letter from Shawn McCarthy, Director, League of Fans, to
Myles Brand, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association and Scott
Blanchard, President, National Federation of State High School Associations (May
8, 2003) [hereinafter League of Fans] (stating Massachusetts ban watched with
great interest by other states considering ban of non-wood bats for high school
baseball regardless of NFHS mandate), available at http://www.leagueoffans.org/
batsletter.html.
13. See Petition Requesting Performance Requirments [sic] for Non-Wood
Baseball Bats, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,525, 37,526 (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter MacKay's
Petition]; Kay Hawes, Former Bat Designer Requests Government Intervention, NCAA
NEws, May 8, 2000 (reporting aluminum bat designer Jack MacKay's petition to
Consumer Product Safety Commission to require wood-like performance for all
non-wood baseball bats and recall of all non-wood bats that exceed wood-bat per-
formance), available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000508/active/
3710n09.html.
MacKay's petition was accompanied by more than twenty technical studies
and references to more than 200 exhibits. See Barnett, supra note 2 (conveying
MacKay's efforts). The petition was subsequently denied by the Commission. See
Letter from Todd Stevenson, Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, to J.W. MacKay, Jr. (Apr. 5, 2002) (denying MacKay's petition on basis of
insufficient information), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/LIBRARY/FOIA/
FOIA02/petition/Baseball.pdf. Among the reasons for denial, the Commission
stated:
Developing requirements for non-wood bats would be a complex matter.
Essentially, the Commission would need to determine what is an unsafe
level of play and what performance requirements for bats are necessary to
bring them to a safe level. Current data and information are not suffi-
cient for this task. Any bat, wood or non-wood[,] can produce injuries or
death. The Commission cannot simply decree that non-wood bats must
perform like wood bats. It cannot presume that wood bats are safe and
non-wood bats are unsafe. Rather, it would have to show that perform-
ance requirements are necessary to change bat performance from some
unreasonable level to an acceptable level. The Commission does not
have information to determine where that line should be drawn ....
[I] t appears that the NCAA, [the American Society for Testing and
Materials], the Amateur Softball Association and the National Federation
of State High School Associations are actively involved in evaluating the
performance of non-wood bats and their possible impact on safety. The
Commission cannot say at this time that their efforts are insufficient. The
Commission is asking the staff to continue monitoring bat performance
and bat-related incidents and the measures taken by those organizations
to address the safety of non-wood bats.
[Vol. 11: p. 77
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support a theory of increased risk.' 4 There certainly is no shortage
of such accounts. 15
In response to serious injuries to minors, the National Federa-
tion of State High School Associations ("NFHS") implemented stan-
dards on the length and weight of non-wood bats in order to limit
the maximum exit-speed of a baseball to 97 miles per hour.16 Alu-
minum bats arguably increase the risk of injury most in the hands
of college players, due to stronger batters and faster pitching at this
level.1 7 The National Collegiate Athletics Association ("NCAA")
adopted aluminum bat performance regulations in 1998, which it
14. See Frank Lombardi, Bill to Foil Aluminum Bats, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Sept. 28,
2002 (noting testimony of President of Louisville Slugger, Marty Archer, at New
York City Council hearing held to consider proposed bill to ban aluminum bats),
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/story/22343p-21218c.html.
Mr. Archer insisted, '[n]o recognized rule-making body has produced any data to
indicate that aluminum bats increase the incidence of injury among players.' Id.;
see also Massachusetts Mulls Ban on Aluminum Bats, supra note 12 (quoting statement
from Jim Darby, then Vice President of major manufacturer of aluminum bats,
that safety question "has been answered" by multiple tests).
15. See Barnett, supra note 2 (observing in 2000 that, while risks associated
with aluminum bats had not been determined, much anecdotal evidence existed
to indicate balls struck by high-performance non-wood bats hit pitchers more fre-
quentiy and caused greater damage).
High school players have suffered severe injuries by balls batted off of alumi-
num bats. See id. One example is the injury suffered by Jeremy Brett, a high
school baseball player in Enid, Oklahoma, who was struck in the face by a line
drive hit off of an aluminum bat in 2000. See id. His face and skull needed five
metal plates, 75 staples, and 12 screws to repair the damage. See id. Today, Brett
continues to suffer from headaches and blind spots in his vision. See id. An
Oklahoma Federal Court awarded Brett $100,000 in December of 2001. See id. In
fact, similar injuries involving aluminum bats have caused deaths. See Oddo Press
Release, supra note 8 (reporting deaths of 17-year-old in 1997 and 14-year-old in
1998, both deaths associated with aluminum bat use).
Severe injuries associated with aluminum bats have been reported outside of
the United States as well. See Barnett, supra note 2 (reporting deaths of at least
seven high school players in Japan since 1974, resulting in requirement that all
high school players wear specially designed helmets).
16. See Press Release, National Federation of State High School Associations,
Bats With BESR Standard Legal Immediately in High School Baseball (Mar. 22,
2002) (requiring aluminum bats used in 2003 to bear Ball Exit Speed Ratio certifi-
cation mark indicating bat meets non-wood bat performance requirements), avail-
able at http://www.nfhs.org/press/prBaseballBESR.asp. These new standards
took effectJanuary 1, 2003. See id. One goal of this organization is ensuring alumi-
num bat performance mirrors the performance of wood bats. See id.; see also Press
Release, National Federation of State High School Associations, NFHS Board of Di-
rectors Approves New Bat Rule (Jan. 7, 2000) (announcing 2001 high school baseball
bat rules, calling for narrower, heavier, and more wood-like bats), available at
http://www.nfhs.org/press/PR-2001-batrule.htm.
17. See Barnett, supra note 2 (noting college injuries). During the 2000 NCAA
regional playoffs in Minnesota, two college pitchers were hit in the face in one
week; both pitchers suffered broken jaws, and one had to have titanium plates
inserted to repair the damage. See id.
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planned to implement in August of 1999 after further study; this
decision was based partly on the 54 percent increase in team home-
run averages between 1994 and 1998, and the NCAA's desire to re-
store competitive balance to the game.'" Explaining its decision to
delay implementation, the NCAA recognized the real potential for
injury but asserted the importance of its adoption of independent
verifiable testing to assure appropriate standards for collegiate com-
petition. 19 In the meantime, college pitcher, Andrew Sanchez, suf-
fered a fractured skull when a baseball, estimated by one expert to
have been traveling as fast as 107 miles per hour, struck him in the
forehead.20
A California Court of Appeal recently revived Sanchez's at-
tempt to seek relief in negligence actions against the NCAA and
aluminum bat manufacturer, Hillerich & Bradsby.21 Part II of this
Note begins with background information on non-wood bats, in-
cluding prevalence, advantages, disadvantages, and performance
evaluation standards. 22 Part III presents (1) the facts, arguments,
and procedural background of Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.; (2)
California's assumption of risk doctrine; (3) the evidence presented
18. See Theodore A. Breidenthal, New Standards for Baseball Bats Effective in Au-
gust 1999, NCAA NEWS, Aug. 17, 1998 (reporting original effective date for new
guidelines as January 1, 1999 and subsequent delay to August 1, 1999 to allow
independent study), available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1998/19980817/
active/3530n01.html; see also Kelly & Pedersen, supra note 8 (noting after receiving
research that indicated rising rate of serious injuries to pitchers from batted line
drives, NCAA adopted stricter guidelines for performance standards of aluminum
bats, but postponed implementation); Lon Eubanks, NCAA Mutes the Bats; College
Baseball: Changes in Specifications Will Limit Home Run Potential Beginning With the
2000 Season, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1998, at C1 (reporting NCAA's decision). Follow-
ing NCAA efforts to provide a safer playing environment, manufacturers of both
wood and non-wood bats brought antitrust law suits, each alleging that the NCAA
had conspired to lock the other out of the market. See Kelly & Pedersen, supra
note 8. The courts upheld the NCAA's right to change the guidelines. See id.
However, after subsequent studies, the NCAA's expert panel raised the maximum
batted-ball exit-velocity from 93 to 97 miles per hour, and the NCAA adopted these
regulations in 2000. See id.
19. See Breidenthal, supra note 18 (reporting statements from NCAA).
20. See Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 539 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (noting expert James G. Kent's estimation that ball that hit Sanchez
"was traveling between 101 and 107.8 miles per hour, probably closer to the latter
speed than the former"); see also Barnett, supra note 2 (describing pitcher's injury).
21. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541-42 (denying both defendants' motions
for summary judgment); see also Court of Appeal Holds Pitcher's Suit Against Maker of
Aluminum Bat Not Barred by Assumption-of-Risk Rule, METROPOLITAN NEws-ENTER-
PRISE, Dec. 20, 2002 (reporting reinstatement of products liability and negligence
actions against manufacturer of aluminum bats), available at http://www.metnews.
com/articles/sanc122002.htm.
22. For background information on use and standards for aluminum bat per-
formance, see infra notes 26-54 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11: p. 77
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by Sanchez to defeat defendants' motions for summary judgment;
and (4) the analysis upon which the court of appeal relied in reach-
ing its decision to reverse summary judgment and revive Sanchez's
action. 23 Part IV examines a defendant's duty of care in the sports
context under California's assumption of risk doctrine and employs
an interjurisdictional comparison of duty assessment as it might be
applied to similar plaintiff-athletes in negligence actions.24 Part V
of this Note concludes by addressing the possible impact of Sanchez
on the aluminum bat controversy in light of mounting evidence
that although newer generations of aluminum bats offered break-
through performance advantages, they may have increased injury
risks for countless amateur players.25
II. BACKGROUND ON HIGH-PERFORMANCE NON-WOOD BATS
A. Prevalence of Use
Amateur teams encourage their players to use aluminum bats,
and while these teams still permit their players to use wood bats,
almost none do.26 The vast majority of bats made and used in
America are made of aluminum and aluminum alloys.27 In 2000,
consumers spent $93 million on 2.1 million aluminum bats. 28
Many aluminum bat manufacturers offer free bats and compensa-
tion to college baseball programs and coaches under endorsement
agreements. 29 According to one report, some 150 Division I
23. For a summary of the facts, arguments, and procedural background of
Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby, see infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text. For an
analysis of relevant assumption of risk theories raised in Sanchez, as well as a review
of the evidence presented therein, see infra notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
24. For an application of California's assumption of risk doctrine and related
policy considerations, see infra notes 93-141 and accompanying text. For an in-
terjurisdictional comparison of duty assessment applicable to similar plaintiff-ath-
letes in negligence actions, see infra notes 142-84 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the possible impact of Sanchez on the aluminum bat
controversy, including governing athletic organizations and sports equipment
manufacturers, see infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
26. See Barnett, supra note 2 (noting outside of professional baseball, very few
wood bats are used).
27. See id. (stating 90% of bats made in America in 2000 were metal based on
data from National Sporting Goods Association).
28. See id. (reporting National Sporting Goods Association statistics for 2000).
29. See Eubanks, supra note 18 (noting dependence of many college baseball
programs on bat manufacturers' financial support). In 1998, approximately 150
Division I coaches had endorsement contracts with bat manufacturers that supple-
mented their incomes. See id. 'The bat manufacturers have been very good to us
and to college baseball in general .... We don't have to buy any bats now, and
that's a big plus for our program in this day of reduced budgets.' Id. (quoting
California State Fullerton baseball coach, George Horton, describing conflict be-
7
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coaches have team and/or personal contracts with various alumi-
num bat manufacturers. 30
B. Advantages: Durability and Performance Edge
The prevalence of aluminum bat use relates to the practical
advantages of aluminum over wood.3 ' Aluminum bats are highly
economical for college and youth baseball leagues because they are
virtually unbreakable. 32 When the NCAA approved the use of alu-
minum baseball bats for intercollegiate competition in July of 1973,
its decision was based in part on increased durability and decreased
overall costs of non-wood bats.33
Many argue that the popularity of aluminum bats is primarily
attributable to the performance advantages of aluminum over
wood. 34 By design, some aluminum bats substantially conform to
wood-bat performance in total weight, swing weight, and barrel per-
formance.35 However, newer generations of aluminum bats incor-
tween loyalty to bat manufacturers and coaches' desire to restore competitive bal-
ance to college baseball).
30. See Barnett, supra note 2 (noting extensive use of aluminum bats in Divi-
sion I programs).
31. For a discussion of the advantages of aluminum bats, see infra notes 32-39
and accompanying text. Major advantages include durability and batting
performance.
32. See Lombardi, supra note 14 (noting testimony of one youth baseball
coach at New York City Council hearing held to consider proposed bill to ban
aluminum bats). The coach stated that while he usually buys three metal bats per
year at $150 each, a ban on aluminum bats would force him to buy 40-50 wood bats
per year at $50 each. See id.
33. See Oddo Press Release, supra note 8 (predicting detrimental effects, in-
cluding injuries and deaths, associated with new generations of aluminum bats).
34. See Cusimano, supra note 10, at 1062 (summarizing advantages of alumi-
num over wood). "[A] luminum bats became lighter and more powerful as manu-
facturers started using more durable metal, stretched more thinly. Consequently,
aluminum bats enabled batters to swing faster . . . 'and bat speed is what deter-
mines power."' Id. at 1070 (quoting Steven Ashley, High Tech Up at Bat, POPULAR
Sci., May 1992, at 108). But see Barnett, supra note 2 (quoting North Carolina State
baseball coach, Elliott Avent, as claiming, "[i]f the ball is coming back faster, it's
because the players are bigger and swinging harder"); Crisco & Greenwald, supra
note 8 (acknowledging statistical increases in many offensive categories are likely
attributable to advances in equipment performance and better player perfor-
mance).
35. See Crisco & Greenwald, supra note 8 (explaining significance of total
weight and swing weight). Importantly, a difference in barrel construction may
lead to what is "commonly referred to as 'trampoline effect."' Id. In particular,
the authors commented:
[T]o make a metal bat ... perform like a wood bat, the bats must have
similar total weight, swing weight, and barrel performance. The total
weight is the weight of the bat, typically measured without any grip mate-
rial. Swing weight is a measure of how the weight is distributed along the
length of the bat; for two bats of the same total weight, a bat with more
[Vol. 11: p. 77
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porate thinner, lighter construction that affects ball exit-speed by
allowing faster swings and increasing the trampoline effect.3 6 Alu-
minum bats also feature a much larger "sweet spot" than wood
bats.37
A comparison of offensive statistics of players using wood bats
in summer leagues and aluminum bats during the regular season
suggests that aluminum bats enhance player performance. 38 The
distinction has become especially apparent at the college level,
where young players have posted higher performance statistics than
professional players and have shattered long-held records.
39
weight towards the grip can be swung faster .... Barrel performance...
can be described as follows. The more a baseball deforms on impact, the
more energy is lost, and the slower the baseball can rebound. The barrels
of modern metal baseball bats can deform more than those of their pred-
ecessors. By designing a bat to deform more, the ball will deform less.
This trampoline effect results in greater ball rebound and therefore in-
creased batted ball speed.
Id. (citations omitted). See Former Bat Designer Requests Government Intervention, 1
LoCKER RooM, at http://www.naso.org/lockerroom/LockerRoom0500.html (May
15, 2000) (citing statements by jack MacKay arguing one can retain cost-effective-
ness of aluminum bats without increased dangers allegedly presented by newer
designs); see also Hawes, supra note 13 (reporting that MacKay believes there is a
place in bat industry for aluminum bats that perform like wood bats).
36. See Crisco & Greenwald, supra note 8 (explaining physical advantages of
thinner, lighter aluminum bats); Science at the Stadium: Teacher Resource, at http://
www.turnerleaming.com/efts/bball/science.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (ex-
plaining "trampoline effect"). The article explains the "trampoline effect" is when
.the bat will deform more, causing the ball to deform less, retain more energy, and
rebound faster." Id. Authors Crisco and Greenwald also explain hitting the ball
on the sweet spot is advantageous because less energy is lost to vibrations and more
energy is transferred to the ball. See id.
37. See MacKay's Petition, supra note 13; Oddo Press Release, supra note 8
(defining "sweet spot" as part of bat that most effectively launches ball and citing
data estimating "sweet spot" of aluminum bat is 470% larger than that of wood
bats).
38. See Barnett, supra note 2 (summarizing results of 1997 study conducted by
William Thurston, baseball coach at Amherst College in Massachusetts and former
editor of NCAA's Baseball Rules Committee, tracking 90 players participating in
both wood and metal bat leagues). A batting average decrease of .107 accompa-
nied the players' switch to wood bats and home run percentages dropped 67%. See
id.
39. See Stefan Fatsis, Mettle Test: NCAA Puts Aluminum Bats to Test of Fire, ST.
Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, May 6, 1996, at 18 (reporting at 1996 College World Series,
teams pounded 48 home runs in 14 games where previous record was 29). "Some
homers sailed over the bleachers, 30 feet high, into a parking lot 450 feet from
home plate. So was it the strong tail wind? Or an exceptional crop of hitters? Or
was it the state-of-the-art aluminum bat[s]?" Id.
9
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C. Disadvantages: Inherent Difficulties in
Performance Measurement
Aluminum bats have undoubtedly changed the nature of ama-
teur baseball, in some ways for the worse.40 Many commentators
argue that a college player's performance using aluminum bats is
not a reliable indicator of the player's skill and ability to hit well
with wood bats in professional baseball. 41 Concerns about player
safety, however, clearly trump player evaluation issues.42
Inherent difficulties in measuring aluminum bat performance
potential further complicate a comparison to wood bat perform-
ance or a determination of appropriate performance standards.43
For instance, the performance of aluminum bats differs over time;
with use, the metal may develop more spring, increasing the tram-
poline effect and producing faster exit-speeds. 44 Additionally, eval-
uations must consider the much larger "sweet spot" of an
aluminum bat and how this affects exit-speed. 45 Moreover, it is ac-
knowledged that some factors affecting performance of aluminum
over time are not yet well understood by the scientific community. 46
Finally, there is an obvious conflict of interest in relying on manu-
40. See generally Cusimano, supra note 10, at 1071 (summarizing changes in
sport of baseball resulting from innovations in aluminum bat materials and de-
sign); see also Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 537 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (characterizing NCAA's own concerns regarding aluminum bat us-
age and supporting that characterization with portions of NCAA's 1998 letter from
its Baseball Rules Committee to organizations under its umbrella). "The NCAA
not only believed that the newer aluminum bats created an increased risk of harm
to players, but it also believed that use of these bats changed the nature of the
sport of college baseball." Id.
41. See generally Steve Forbes, Baseball Bats, THE NCAA NEWS, at http://www.
ncaa.org/news/1998/19981207/comment.html (Dec. 7, 1998) (arguing NCAA
should decree return to wood bats because aluminum bats distort nature of base-
ball players' abilities).
42. See generally Barnett, supra note 2 (discussing alleged dangers of new gen-
erations of aluminum bats).
43. See id. (observing alleged hazards of aluminum bats are difficult to mea-
sure and thus allegations are difficult to confirm or negate). "What you find is you
are naive about what a bat is doing .... There is a whole lot more going on than
you thought." Id. (quoting NCAA spokesman Wally Renfro's observations of diffi-
culties encountered in measuring aluminum bat performance).
44. See id. (recounting conclusions about aluminum bat performance already
confirmed by NCAA studies).
45. See Oddo Press Release, supra note 8 (stating aluminum bats' sweet spot is
470% larger than that of wood bats).
46. See Crisco & Greenwald, supra note 8 (noting other factors likely to influ-
ence bat performance, such as bat shaft flex, are not yet well understood).
[Vol. 11: p. 77
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol11/iss1/3
2004] INCREASING THE INHERENT RISKS OF BASEBALL 87
facturers to adequately test and disclose performance results when
such a disclosure may harm sales. 47
D. Recent Debate
Stricter NCAA requirements went into effect in 2000, but ex-
perts allege obvious loopholes still exist which allow manufacturers
to increase exit-speed. 48 Researchers criticize the NCAA for failing
to publicly disclose the testing methods and results upon which it
relied in implementing its new performance standards. 49 Although
methods of measuring aluminum bat performance remain the sub-
ject of debate, research supports the conclusion that batted balls
exit aluminum bats faster than they exit wood bats. 50 A common-
sense inference from this conclusion is that a faster exit-velocity
constitutes an increased risk of injury to defensive players - as one
expert has questioned, "if [the ball] is hit harder more often, isn't
there a greater risk of injury?" 51
Governing athletic organizations have issued stricter perform-
ance regulations in light of recent studies, and there appears to be
new initiative to discover and regulate aluminum bat perform-
47. See Barnett, supra note 2 (relaying assertion of bat designer Jack MacKay
and others that manufacturers' lab tests fail to adequately reveal possible exit-
speeds because applied swing speeds are underestimated); League of Fans, supra
note 12 (likening bat manufacturers' responsibility for student-athlete safety in
baseball to a "fox guarding the henhouse" model).
48. See Kay Hawes, Baseball Bat Standards Return to the Examination Table: New
Focus is on Potential Loophole Involving Swing Speed, THE NCAA NEWS, at http://www.
ncaa.org/news/2000/20000410/active/3708n01.html (Apr. 10, 2000) (noting Dr.
Jim Sherwood's discovery); see also Crisco & Greenwald, supra note 8 (alleging
loophole discovered by Sherwood was obvious and positing such a belated ac-
knowledgment was evidence that studies upon which NCAA relied may have failed
to consider certain performance factors).
49. See Crisco & Greenwald, supra note 8 (noting NCAA-mandated regulation
of baseball bats using performance measurements from Baum Hitting Machine
("BHM")). The BHM is a research tool developed at the University of Massachu-
setts. See id. Since 1997, "no public disclosure has been made of the BHM's meth-
odology, calibration, or result validation." Id. Arguably, this system of testing is
fundamentally flawed because methods cannot be examined or reproduced by
other laboratories. See id.
50. See Alan M. Nathan, Characterizing the Performance of Baseball Bats, 71 Am. J.
PHYs. 134, 134 (2003) (citing study using high speed video techniques to accu-
rately measure pre-collision and post-collision ball and bat speeds to conclusively
demonstrate improved effectiveness of some aluminum bats); see also Crisco &
Greenwald, supra note 8 (recounting long-held belief that metal bats out-perform
wood bats was not scientifically validated until recently). Specifically, the belief was
validated in three conclusive studies conducted in 1999 and 2000. See id.
51. See Barnett, supra note 2 (quoting NCAA's Bill Thurston's attempt to sim-
plify issues of increased risk).
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ance. 5 2 Unfortunately, however, over the course of this debate,
players were injured.5 3 This Note now examines one attempt to ad-
judicate harms that occurred in absence of aluminum bat perform-
ance standards and addresses the legal considerations facing similar
plaintiff-athletes. 54
III. SANCHEZ V. HLLERICH & BRADSBY Co.
A. Background
1. Facts
Andrew Sanchez, a college pitcher, sustained serious head inju-
ries in 1999 when a line-drive ball hit with an "Air Attack 2" alumi-
num alloy bat struck him in the head. 55 Sanchez's injuries required
the care of a neurologist for more than two years and caused him to
drop out of college. 56
The bat was supplied to the University of Southern California
("USC") batter pursuant to an agreement between Hillerich &
Bradsby and USC; the agreement stated that USC would receive
compensation for the team's exclusive use of Hillerich & Bradsby's
52. See Nathan, supra note 50, at 134 (citing long-awaited validation of sus-
pected aluminum bat performance advantages in conclusive studies); see also supra
notes 16 & 18 and accompanying text (discussing new performance regulations
imposed by high school and collegiate athletic organizations). But see League of
Fans, supra note 12 (criticizing governing athletic organizations' efforts to regulate
non-wood bat performance as insufficient). In a letter to the NCAA and to NFHS
presidents, on behalf of a sports industry watchdog group founded by Ralph Na-
der, McCarthy states:
To be sure, the bat performance rules and testing standards that are now
in use represent a positive step forward from the scarcely regulated bat
industry of the mid-to-late 1990s. But these regulations still fall danger-
ously short of where they should be. Representatives of the NCAA and
NFHS have each stated in the past that they want the performance of bats
to be wood-like, yet neither governing body is willing to either: 1) require
bats to be made out of wood; or 2) require bats that are not made out of
wood to not exceed the performance of wood in any way.
Id.
53. See Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 531 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (recalling facts of injury to college pitcher Andrew Sanchez, occurring
April 2, 1999, after NCAA's adoption of aluminum bat performance guidelines but
prior to the delayed implementation of those regulations).
54. For a discussion of the facts and legal issues arising in Sanchez, see infra
notes 55-129 and accompanying text.
55. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531 (summarizing circumstances of plain-
tiffs injuries during college game).
56. See Baseball Bat Lawsuit Reinstated, at http://www.varsityedge.com/nei/
varsity.nsf/0/cb25dfb5df7c433f85256cbc00644a53?OpenDocument (last visited
Jan. 12, 2004) (reporting Sanchez's injury and consequences).
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Louisville Slugger equipment. 57 At the time of Sanchez's injury,
NCAA rules allowed the use of non-wood bats such as the "Air At-
tack 2."58 Prior to the start of the 1999 season, the NCAA notified
athletic conferences under its umbrella of the dangerous nature of
newer metal bats and of its decision to implement new regulations
to decrease the maximum exit-speed of non-wood bats, effective Au-
gust 1, 1999.59
2. Arguments
Sanchez filed suit against Hillerich & Bradsby, USC, the NCAA,
and the Pacific-10 Athletic Conference ("Pac-10") on March 17,
2000, asserting causes of action for products liability and negli-
gence. 60 Sanchez specifically alleged that "use of this particular bat
significantly increased the inherent risk in baseball that a pitcher
would be hit by a line drive and that the unique design properties
of this bat were the cause of his injuries."61
In response to the suit, each defendant moved separately for
summary judgment.62 In support of its motion, Hillerich & Bradsby
argued: (1) Sanchez had failed to establish causation; (2) the doc-
trines of primary and express assumption of risk barred Sanchez's
action; and (3) the bat complied with the rules established by the
NCAA. 63 In support of its motion, the NCAA argued: (1) the doc-
trine of primary assumption of risk barred the claim; (2) Sanchez
could not establish causation; and (3) it owed no duty to Sanchez
because the baseball community was in significant disagreement
over the risk presented by aluminum bats at the time of the
injury. 64
57. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532 (describing use agreement between
school and bat manufacturer).
58. See id. (providing factual and procedural background).
59. See id. (recounting circumstances of the injury). Prior to the start of the
1999 season, the Pac-10 athletic conference had implemented some of the NCAA's
proposed standards. See id.
60. See id. Sanchez sued Hillerich & Bradsby, USC, the NCAA, and the Pac-10
for products liability and negligence but subsequently dropped the products liabil-
ity claims against USC and Pac-10. See id.
61. See id. at 531 (quoting complaint).
62. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531. (discussing procedural background
of Sanchez).
63. See id. (recounting grounds on which Hillerich & Bradsby based its sum-
mary judgment motion).
64. See id. at 533 (stating grounds for NCAA's summary judgment motion).
The court could not consider the NCAA's documentation supporting its motion
because it was not properly authenticated; the court thus treated NCAA's summary
judgment motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id. at 533-34.
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Plaintiff and defendants stipulated to several facts, including:
(1) the bat was apparently manufactured in compliance with NCAA
regulations; (2) the bat was designed to cause the ball to come off
the bat at a higher launch speed than that of wood bats and older
metal bats; (3) the bat's inventor believed the bat substantially in-
creased the risk of a pitcher being hit by a line-drive ball; and (4)
the bat's inventor complained to his former employers at Hillerich
& Bradsby about these increased risks.65 The parties offered depo-
sition testimony of experts and other individuals who had witnessed
the injury.66 Hillerich & Bradsby offered testimony to establish pri-
mary assumption of risk and lack of proof of causation.6 7
3. Procedural Posture
The trial court concluded that Sanchez would not be able to
prove causation and granted the summary judgment motions of
Hillerich & Bradsby, USC, and the Pac-10. 68 The court did not
grant summary judgment to the NCAA. 69 Sanchez appealed, and
the California Court of Appeal for the Second District granted cer-
tiorari to determine whether the trial court had properly granted
the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 70
65. See id. at 536 (stating undisputed facts).
66. See id. at 532-34 (summarizing deposition testimony presented by all
parties).
67. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532-33 (summarizing declarations sup-
porting summary judgment motion). One CSUN coach testified to having wit-
nessed this incident as well as other similar ones in the past, and offered his
opinion that the risk of being hit by a batted ball was inherent in the sport. See id.
at 532. The USC head coach testified the game had not been videotaped and that,
in his opinion, metal bats did not perform differently than wood bats. See id.
Moreover, Hillerich & Bradsby's president, Marty Archer, testified his company
manufactured bats in conformance with NCAA regulations. See id. Also, CSUN's
head athletic trainer testified that when she presented the college's disclaimer
form to a player, she read aloud the assumption of risk provision word-for-word
before the player signed it. See id. Finally, Hillerich & Bradsby offered the plain-
tiff s admission at deposition that he knew that pitchers risked being hit by line
drives. Id. at 533.
68. See id. at 534 (recounting trial court's grant of summary judgment to
defendants).
69. See id. The NCAA failed to submit admissible evidence, and, thus, the
court could not treat its motion as one for summaryjudgment. See id. Instead, the
trial court treated the NCAA's motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, con-
cluding Sanchez would be unable to truthfully plead causation against the NCAA.
See id.
70. For a discussion of the court of appeal's analysis, see infra notes 71-92 and
accompanying text.
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B. Primary Assumption of Risk
Both the NCAA and Hillerich & Bradsby asserted California's
primary assumption of risk doctrine completely barred Sanchez
from recovery for negligence. 7' Under this doctrine, a defendant
owes no duty to protect a voluntary participant against a risk of
harm inherent in the sport.72 Sanchez opposed the defendants'
motions for summary judgment, asserting primary assumption of
risk did not apply because the increased risk presented by the bat's
design was a substantial cause of his injuries.73 Sanchez argued the
design of the "Air Attack 2" enabled a batter to hit a ball at speeds
in excess of that which would allow a pitcher to avoid being hit, and
thereby increased the risks inherent in baseball.74 In California, a
defendant owes no duty of care to protect a voluntary participant
against the risks inherent in a sport, but does owe a duty of care not
to increase those inherent risks.75
71. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532-33 (reiterating NCAA's contentions).
72. See id. at 535-36 (delineating assumption of risk doctrine as set forth by
California Supreme Court). The Sanchez court relied on Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d
696 (Cal. 1992), in distinguishing between primary and secondary assumption of
risk:
(1) those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a
legal conclusion that there is 'no duty' on the part of the defendant to
protect the plaintiff from a particular risk - the category of assumption
of risk that the legal commentators generally refer to as 'primary assump-
tion of risk' - and (2) those instances in which the defendant does owe a
duty of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk
of injury caused by the defendant's breach of that duty - what most
commentators have termed 'secondary assumption of risk.' . . . First, in
'primary assumption of risk' cases - where the defendant owes no duty
to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of harm - a plaintiff who
has suffered such harm is not entitled to recover from the defendant,
whether the plaintiff's conduct in undertaking the activity was reasonable
(or unreasonable). Second, in 'secondary assumption of risk' cases -
involving instances in which the defendant has breached the duty of care
owed to the plaintiff - the defendant is not entitled to be entirely re-
lieved of liability for an injury proximately caused by such a breach, sim-
ply because the plaintiffs conduct in encountering the risk of such an
injury was reasonable rather than unreasonable ....
Id. at 535 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 703-04). Defendants
also asserted no eidence existed that the "Air Attack 2" increased the speed at
which the ball left the bat in this particular case. See id. at 538. Thus, the plaintiff
could not prove causation. See id.
73. See id. at 533.
74. See id. at 533 (incorporating statements from Jack MacKay that "Air Attack
2"'s design prevented pitchers from having sufficient time to avoid being hit, and
James Kent, whose estimation of ball speed gave pitcher reaction time of only .32
to .37 seconds).
75. See Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 687 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (setting forth holding).
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C. Evidence of Increased Inherent Risk
Sanchez offered four witness and expert declarations in sup-
port of his increased inherent risk argument. 76 Citing an NCAA-
initiated study that tracked pitcher injuries from high-performance
aluminum bats, William Thurston, a college baseball coach and for-
mer Editor of the NCAA Baseball Rules Committee, testified that
the design and use of the "Air Attack 2" substantially increased the
risk of a pitcher being hit by a line drive over that associated with
wood bats or earlier generations of non-wood bats.7 7 Thurston re-
ferred to a compilation and analysis of college baseball statistics and
testified that a tremendous increase in hits and runs resulted when
players used aluminum bats.78
James G. Kent, a clinical kinesiologist, also offered testimony
on the plaintiff's behalf, based on his training as a forensic exam-
iner specializing in the analysis of the biomechanics of trauma, his
review of NCAA rules and literature, and his review of the medical
evidence of Sanchez's injury.79 Kent estimated that the ball that hit
Sanchez was traveling between 101 and 107.8 miles per hour, giving
Sanchez only .32 to .37 seconds to avoid being hit - a timeframe
that falls below the minimum reaction time required by the
NCAA.80
In addition, Jack MacKay testified that he witnessed the timed
studies Hillerich & Bradsby performed on the "Air Attack 2."81
MacKay stated, "[the bat] allowed a batter to hit a ball at speeds in
76. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533 (recalling statements given in deposi-
tion testimony).
77. See id. (stating results of Thurston's studies).
78. See id. (restating Thurston's conclusions).
79. See id. (recalling Kent's expert qualifications).
80. See id. at 533, 538-39 (quoting Kent's conclusions based on review of evi-
dence and literature). Kent stated:
[I] t is more probable than not that Mr. Sanchez's head injury resulted from
the use of a baseball bat which possessed mechanical properties allowing
a batted ball to attain a flight velocity in excess of a velocity that would
allow for a reasonable reaction time by a pitcher in a post-delivery posture
in a game situation.
Id. at 540. Kent's estimation of a reaction time falling between 32 and .37 seconds
falls below the NCAA-accepted reaction time of .39 seconds. See id. at 540-41 (not-
ing most experts who provided information to NCAA Rules Committee believed
college pitchers need approximately .4 seconds to react and move to avoid being
struck). Specifically, Kent asserted:
At 94 mph the ball will [reach the pitcher] in approximately .371 seconds
.... [Use of] high powered aluminum bats often result in speeds well in
excess of 100 [miles per hour]. At 100 mph, the ball will [reach the
pitcher] in .354 seconds; at 110 mph . . . in .321 seconds.
Id. at 541.
81. Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533 (noting designer's testimony).
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excess of that which would have given a pitcher time to avoid being
hit."8 2 Thus, in MacKay's opinion, the bat substantially increased
the risk of a pitcher being hit by a batted ball.8 3
D. Analysis and Reversal of Summary Judgment
1. Primary Assumption of Risk
The court of appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants, holding sufficient evidence had been
presented to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the design and use of the "Air Attack 2" substantially increased the
inherent risks faced by baseball players.8 4 In its analysis, the court
of appeal relied on a similar case, Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc.s 5
In Branco, the plaintiff crashed his BMX bicycle and injured
himself while participating in a race around a motocross course
containing jumps.8 6 The plaintiffs expert witness testified that the
design of a particular jump on the course created an extreme risk
of injury above the risks inherent in motocross.8 7 The appellate
court reversed the lower court's summary judgment decision and
held that while jumps and falls were inherent in the sport of
motocross, the sport did not mandate jumps designed in such a way
as to create an extreme risk of injury. 8 The plaintiffs expert testi-
mony regarding the design of the jump created a triable issue of
82. See id. (quoting MacKay's deposition testimony). MacKay designed and
tested bats for ten years and Hillerich & Bradsby paid him as a consultant for their
Louisville Slugger division. See id.
83. See id. MacKay testified he warned Hillerich & Bradsby of the increased
safety risks inherent in the design of the "Air Attack 2," but his warnings were
ignored. See id. He eventually resigned from Hillerich & Bradsby. See id.; see also
MacKay's Petition, supra note 13 (petitioning Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion to recall all non-wood bats that exceeded performance of wood bats). In his
petition, MacKay asserted, "non-wood bats (primarily composed of aluminum and
composite materials) have become increasingly dangerous." Id. MacKay stated
such bats have a faster bat swing speed, a larger sweet spot, and a lower balance
point than wood bats, allowing the ball to achieve a faster exit velocity such that a
pitcher does not have time to react if a ball is batted directly toward him. See id.
For these reasons, MacKay asserted that some non-wood bats present an unreason-
able risk of injury. See id.
84. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (finding evidence sufficient to estab-
lish material issue of whether "Air Attack 2" substantially increased inherent risks
in baseball by increasing speed at which baseball left bat when compared to other
metal and wood bats).
85. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see also Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 537-38 (finding Branco's analysis persuasive).
86. See Branco, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394-95 (describing circumstances of plain-
tiff's injury).
87. See id. at 395, 398 (discussing expert's testimony on behalf of plaintiff).
88. See id. at 398 (discussing holding).
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fact as to whether the design of the jump increased the risks of
injury above those inherent in motocross.89 Similarly, the Sanchez
court of appeal found the expert testimony offered by the plaintiff
supported a material issue of fact as to whether the primary assump-
tion of risk doctrine should apply to bar the action. 90
2. Causation
The defendants argued that because the speed of the ball leav-
ing the bat was never established, Sanchez could not attribute cau-
sation to use of the "Air Attack 2."91 The court of appeal rejected
that argument, emphasizing Dr. Kent's estimation of the speed at
which the ball was traveling, and concluding that his expert opin-
ion and the evidence on which he relied were sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact regarding causation. 92
IV. APPORTIONING LIABILiTY: ANALYSIS OF SANCHEZ ON REMAND
A. California's Assumption of Risk Doctrine
1. Duty
A negligence action can only arise where the defendant owed a
duty to the plaintiff.9 3 In determining whether primary assumption
of risk applies and bars a plaintiffs relief in California, the inquiry
does not begin with the question of whether the plaintiff assumed
the risk; rather, the inquiry begins and ends with an assessment of
whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.94 A
determination of the existence of a duty is a question of law to be
decided by the court.95 The court considers the nature of the sport
and the general relationship of each party to the sport to decide, as
89. See id. (reversing summary judgment).
90. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (holding evidence sufficient to estab-
lish material issue of fact and defeat motion for summary judgment).
91. See id. 538-39 (rejecting proposition that summary judgment must be
granted when causation not established).
92. See id. (stating holding).
93. See Foronda ex. rel. Estate of Foronda v. Haw. Int'l Boxing Club, 25 P.3d
826, 836 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining "there being no legal duty to breach,
there can be no talk of negligence").
94. See Harrold v. Rolling "J" Ranch, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 674 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (discussing holding).
95. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 705 (Cal. 1992) (describing nature of
assumption of risk analysis); Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 669 P.2d 154, 158 (Haw. 1983)
("The existence of a duty... is entirely a question of law.").
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a matter of public policy, whether the defendant should owe the
plaintiff a duty of care. 96
2. Inherent Risk
Integral to the court's determination of the existence of a duty
is the inherency of the risk presented by the defendant's conduct.97
Generally, no duty exists to protect the plaintiff against a risk inher-
ent in the sport.98 If the defendant's conduct presented a risk in-
herent in the sport, he or she owes no duty to the plaintiff, and
recovery is barred.99 If the defendant's conduct presented a new or
additional risk to the sport, then the defendant may have owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff.'00 If a duty may have been owed, sec-
ondary assumption of risk governs, allowing possible recovery for
the plaintiff under California's comparative negligence princi-
ples. 0 1
Whether the defendant's conduct was an inherent risk turns
on the nature of the sport and the relationship of the defendant
and plaintiff to that sport.10 2 The standards of the industry define
the nature of the sport.103 A risk is inherent in the sport if its elimi-
nation would (1) chill vigorous participation in the sport, and (2)
alter the fundamental nature of the sport.'0 4
B. Applying Primary Assumption of Risk to Sanchez
As acknowledged by the Sanchez court, the risk of a sharply bat-
ted ball striking a defensive player is inherent in the sport of base-
96. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 535 (relying on Shannon v. Rhodes, 112
Cal. Rptr. 2d 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
97. See id. (noting California's objective approach to determination of exis-
tence of duty).
98. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 (explaining duty in sports context).
99. See Bidar, 669 P.2d at 158 (demonstrating where there was no duty, there
was no breach); see also Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 687
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting same).
100. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 (noting "it is well established that defendants
generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant
over and above those inherent in the sport").
101. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536 (discussing court's analysis).
102. See id. (stating considerations for determining inherency of risk).
103. See id. (explaining nature of sport and citing relevant California law); see
also Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(describing inherent risks of skydiving and snow skiing and implying industry stan-
dards place acceptance of risks on participants).
104. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536 (providing guidance for determining
inherent risk).
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ball. 10 5 Sanchez acknowledged his awareness of this risk. 10 6 The
court should still permit Sanchez to seek relief under comparative
fault principles because the design of the "Air Attack 2," which max-
imized ball exit-speed, increased the risk of injury beyond those in-
herent in baseball. 10 7 Due to this increased risk, the defendants
may owe a duty of care to Sanchez, and primary assumption of risk
should not bar relief.108
1. Negligence Claim Against Hillerich & Bradsby
The wrongful conduct at issue is Hillerich & Bradsby's pur-
poseful design of the "Air Attack 2" to increase exit-speed of batted
balls. 109 Based on the evidence presented, Sanchez may be able to
prove that Hillerich & Bradsby increased the inherent risks of base-
ball by knowingly designing the "Air Attack 2" to maximize exit-
speed. 11° It is "undisputed that the Air Attack 2 was designed to
cause the ball to come off the bat at a higher launch speed than
with wood bats and older metal bats." 1 ' After witnessing timed
studies, MacKay asserted the design did increase exit-speed.11 2 As
the court of appeal concluded, if the design of the bat increased
exit-speed, "it thus follows that the ball must have reached
105. See id. (characterizing sport of baseball).
106. See id. (acknowledging foundational facts of case established prima facie
showing of assumption of risk unless inherent risks had been increased by defend-
ants' conduct).
107. For a discussion of the inapplicability of the primary assumption of risk
defense in Sanchez, see infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
108. See generally Knight v.Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992) (noting while
defendants generally have no duty to eliminate or protect participants from inher-
ent risks, defendants do have duty not to increase these risks). One can infer that
a defendant who increases the risks beyond those inherent in the sport still faces
potential liability.
109. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531 (summarizing plaintiffs allegations
that particular design properties of "Air Attack 2" caused his injuries).
110. A strong argument exists that Hillerich & Bradsby's conduct of designing
bats to increase the exit-speed of a batted ball created a duty of care to athletes. A
bat design that purposefully increases ball exit-speed, necessarily decreases reac-
tion time for defensive players and increases the risks of injury in baseball over
those inherent in the sport. As stated in the Sanchez opinion, Hillenich & Bradsby
undisputedly designed the "Air Attack 2" to increase ball exit-speed. See id. at 538-
39. The court of appeal also found at least a triable issue as to whether the defend-
ants knew and appreciated the nature of the increased risk. See id. at 538. Studies
may also support the conclusion that the design of the bat increased exit-speed of
batted balls. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (recounting Jack Mac-
Kay's testimony).
111. Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536.
112. See id. at 533 (noting MacKay's opinion based on his involvement in de-
sign of "Air Attack 2" and presence at Louisville Slugger's testing center when
timed studies were performed).
Vol. I11: p. 77
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[Sanchez] sooner than if [the batter] had used a bat other than the
Air Attack 2."' 13 If the ball reached him sooner, he had less time to
react, increasing the risk of injury.1 14 If the inherent risk of being
injured by a batted ball was increased, then a predicate duty of care
existed to support a negligence action. 11 5
If Hillerich & Bradsby could demonstrate that elimination of
aluminum bats such as the "Air Attack 2" would both chill vigorous
participation in the sport and alter the fundamental nature of the
sport, it could thereby prove that the additional risk presented by
the bat was inherent in the sport. 116 However, elimination of alu-
minum bats designed to maximize exit-speed would neither alter
baseball's fundamental nature nor deter vigorous participation."i7
Many believe such an elimination would have the opposite effect of
encouraging participation and returning the game of baseball at
the amateur level to its traditional form. 118
113. Id. at 539.
114. See id. (noting Sanchez's reaction time was only .32 to .37 seconds, which
falls below acceptable minimum time required by NCAA).
115. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992) (stating question
of assumption of risk much more amenable to resolution by summary judgment
under duty analysis, where existence and scope of defendant's duty of care legal
question decided by court).
116. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536 (stating "[a] risk is inherent in a
sport if its elimination (1) would chill vigorous participation in the sport; and (2)
would alter the fundamental nature of the activity").
117. For a discussion of how use of high-performance non-wood bats may
have altered college baseball from its traditional form, see supra note 10.
118. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537-38 (quoting 1998 NCAA letter to
college baseball organizations and coaches). The court quoted a substantial por-
tion of a letter sent by the NCAA Baseball Rules Committee, expressing the com-
mittee's belief that newer generations of aluminum bats had both changed the
nature of college baseball and increased the risk of harm to players. Id. Portions
of the letter summarize findings from the NCAA committee that convened in 1998
to examine the escalating performance levels of aluminum bats:
Alarmed by the continuing increase in performance, the anecdotal and
statistical evidence that the game of college baseball has been signifi-
cantly altered by aluminum bat performance, and concerned about the
increased safety risk, the committee determined to study the matter in
depth in the summer of 1998 .... All interested manufacturers, experts,
and other knowledgeable persons were invited to make presentations to
the committee .... The committee was unanimously convinced that bat
performance was indeed a safety risk to pitchers and infielders, that there
has indeed been a change in the way the college game of baseball is
played, and that the available evidence was more than sufficient tojustify
a change in the rule as soon as practically possible. There is simply no
question that aluminum bats substantially outperform traditional wood
bats, that the risk of injury to pitchers and infielders is real, and that a
performance limit on aluminum bats was required to bring the game of
baseball closer to its traditional form.
Id. at 537.
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Because the increased risk of injury presented by a bat de-
signed to increase exit-speed is not a risk inherent in baseball, relief
is not barred, and some liability may be apportioned to Hillerich &
Bradsby. 119 The trier of fact could then determine the relative fault
of plaintiff and defendant and apportion liability. 120
2. Negligence Claim Against the NCAA
The court must assess the NCAA's conduct in allowing high-
performance non-wood bats to be used without implementing per-
formance standards in order to determine whether a duty was owed
to Sanchez. After reaching the conclusion in 1998 that certain alu-
minum bats may present an increased risk of injury to players, the
NCAA undertook a performance evaluation and adopted maxi-
mum exit-speed requirements, which it planned to implement in
1999.121 The NCAA undertook this initiative in an effort to fulfill a
duty to protect players from increased risks.1 22 However, the
NCAA's delay in the implementation of performance guidelines
may have constituted negligence. 123 Once the NCAA validated its
suspicions of increased danger in 1998, it may have had a duty to
avoid delay in suspending or eliminating the bats under Knight v.
Jewett.124
119. See id. at 538 (noting presence of triable issue of fact as to defendants'
knowledge and appreciation of existence of increased risk). If a court finds pri-
mary assumption of risk inapplicable, the issue becomes one of secondary assump-
tion of risk, in which case the relative fault of both plaintiff and defendants must
be compared. See id. Hillerich & Bradsby may face apportionment of liability
under secondary assumption of risk if the jury finds the design of the "Air Attack 2"
not only increased ball exit-speed, but also risks inherent in baseball.
120. See id. at 538 (allocating responsibility for liability apportionment to trier
of fact); Donohue v. San Francisco Housing Auth., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (concluding trier of fact responsible for liability apportionment).
121. See Breidenthal, supra note 18 (reporting scheduled implementation of
NCAA's new specifications and performance standard for baseball bats). Imple-
mentation of the new guidelines, originally scheduled for January 1999, was
delayed until August 1999. See id.
122. See id. (quoting reaction of Baseball Rules Committee Chair, Bill Rowe,
Jr., to rescheduling of implementation of new performance standards). Mr. Rowe
stated, "I am disappointed that the implementation date was moved from January
1 to August 1, 1999, but am confident that the effects of these recommendations
will make the game safer for all participants and provide a better competitive bal-
ance between offense and defense." Id.
123. Because the NCAA's testing and implementation of new guidelines was
not the conduct that increased risk, it follows that the only conduct which could
have constituted the NCAA's alleged negligent breach of duty was either its delay
in implementing the guidelines or its failure to temporarily ban non-wood bats
while conducting tests.
124. SeeKnightv.Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992) (delineating duty anal-
ysis). Under California's duty analysis, duty can extend to conduct the defendant
[Vol. 11: p. 77
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The NCAA asserted that it owed no duty to the defendant be-
cause, at the time of the injury, significant disagreement in the
baseball community existed over the performance of aluminum
bats. 125 The NCAA's argument has merit: without taking the time
to independently study bat performance, the NCAA could not im-
pose effective performance standards. 126 The inherent difficulties
in measuring performance have been previously discussed, and de-
bate over measurement considerations continues today. 127 In light,
however, of the NCAA's conclusion in 1998 that "there is simply no
question that... [r] isk of injury to pitchers and infielders is real," it
might have temporarily suspended the use of aluminum bats, im-
plemented preliminary performance regulations, or taken some
other protective measure during its study period. 128 Even if testing
unavoidably delayed implementation of protective regulations, de-
lay in suspending use of the suspect bats was avoidable and contrib-
uted to the continued existence of increased risk.a29 Thus, the
NCAA may have owed a duty to Sanchez that would support a claim
of negligence.
C. Policy Considerations
1. Sports Equipment Manufacturers
In determining whether Hillerich & Bradsby should owe
Sanchez a duty of care as a matter of public policy, the court will
necessarily look to the role each of the parties played in the
sport. 130 The evidence already presented weighs in favor of finding
that a manufacturer of newly designed sports equipment should
had a duty to avoid engaging in, as well as conduct it had a duty to undertake in
order to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk. See id.
125. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533 (noting NCAA's assertion it owed no
duty to Sanchez).
126. See Breidenthal, supra note 18 (quoting NCAA Executive Committee
Chair's emphasis on acquiring "independent, verifiable testing to assure that we
have appropriate bats for collegiate competition . . . ").
127. For a discussion of the complexities of aluminum bat performance mea-
surement, see supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text. In addition, continued
manufacturer assurance that these bats did not increase danger to players may
support the argument that the NCAA's delay in implementation for the purpose of
undertaking an independent study was not unreasonable. See Oddo Press Release,
supra note 8.
128. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537 (quoting NCAA's 1998 letter expres-
sing safety concerns).
129. See Lombardi, supra note 14 (describing examples of injuries to teenage
baseball players associated with aluminum bats).
130. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708-09 (Cal. 1992) (noting nature of
defendant's duty in sports context depends heavily on nature of sport). Further-
more, the scope of the legal duty owed will also frequently depend on defendant's
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owe a duty of care to athletes with respect to any design feature that
has increased the risks inherent in the sport.' 3 '
The Sanchez case provides an excellent illustration of the un-
derlying policy considerations. In examining the role each of the
parties played in the sport, the court will note that Sanchez was a
college player who had to compete using equipment provided by
his school and approved by his school's rule-making organiza-
tion. 132 Hillerich & Bradsby was a designer and manufacturer of
aluminum bats, providing free bats to colleges and other amateur
teams.1 33 Sanchez was an amateur player unable to differentiate
aluminum bats which perform substantially like wood bats from
those which, by design, maximize exit-speed and present an in-
creased risk of injury. 134 Hillerich & Bradsby purposefully designed
its bats with the goal of increasing ball exit-speed, tested its designs,
and is in a better position to determine any increase in exit-speed
capabilities and act accordingly to communicate and/or limit the
increased risk. 135 Where a manufacturer's conduct has increased
the risks inherent in the sport, that manufacturer should be subject
to liability to an injured participant. 136
2. Athletic Organizations
The court will again look to the role each party played in the
sport in determining, as a matter of public policy, whether athletic
role in, or relationship to, the sport. See id. at 709. See also Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 535 (discussing public policy in considering both parties' roles in sport).
131. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 (noting defendants generally have no duty to
eliminate or protect participants against inherent risks, but defendants have duty
not to increase risks beyond those inherent in sport).
132. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532 (noting college players at USC must
use equipment provided and approved by their school). While one who volunta-
rily participates in a sport may consent to certain inherent risks in that particular
sport, that individual does not consent to a breach of duty by others that increases
the risks beyond what the participant consented to, even where the participant is
aware of the possibility of misconduct by others. See generally Knight, 834 P.2d at
709 ("[A]lthough a [participant] may have acted with knowledge of the potential
negligence, he or she did not consent to such negligent conduct or agree to ex-
cuse the [defendant] from liability in the event of such negligence.").
133. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
135. Risk limiting actions might include: (1) disclosure of manufacturer test-
ing data to governing athletic organizations; (2) warning to users that increased
exit-speed capability is a feature of the bat's design and, thus, reaction time is re-
duced; (3) redesign of the bat to return it to more traditional performance capa-
bilities; or (4) recall of bats which exceed traditional wood bat performance.
136. See generally, Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (concluding defendant owes duty to participant if he increases in-
herent risks of sport).
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organizations like the NCAA should owe players like Sanchez a duty
of care.137 The NCAA was the governing body responsible for sanc-
tioning and regulating the equipment used by its amateur play-
ers.138 The NCAA may have had a duty to test new equipment
where any suspicion of increased injury to players exists. 13 9 This
organization may also have had a duty to suspend the use of suspect
equipment until it could assess the risks associated with the equip-
ment's performance capabilities. 40 For reasons already discussed,
however, it is more appropriate to place the duty of testing new
designs and disclosing results of such testing on the shoulders of
the manufacturer. 14 1
D. Assumption of Risk in Other Jurisdictions
The application of the assumption of risk doctrine and appor-
tionment of liability in sports injury cases varies among jurisdic-
tions142 and can even vary intrajurisdictionally1 43 States like New
York have distinct assumption of risk doctrines, while otherjurisdic-
tions have less concrete doctrines. 144 Some jurisdictions, in line
with the Third Restatement of Torts, have abandoned primary and sec-
ondary assumption of risk theories in favor of a pure comparative
fault scheme.' 45 Other jurisdictions, such as California, maintain
137. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 535 (stating role of parties determine
duty of care).
138. See generally Administration and Governance, at http://www.ncaa.org/index
1.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (summarizing organization's role).
139. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (stating 1998 letter from NCAA to
conferences under its umbrella clearly establishes organization awareness of addi-
tional danger presented by newer aluminum bats).
140. For a discussion of these policy considerations relating to governing ath-
letic organizations, see supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of policy concerns relating to manufacturers, see supra
notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
142. See generally Lura Hess, Note, Sports and the Assumption of Risk Doctrine in
New York, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 457 (2002) (comparing assumption of risk doc-
trines interjurisdictionally and arguing New York's primary assumption of risk doc-
trine should be limited in application to professional athletes).
143. See generally Nicholas J. Cochran, Recent Developments, Fore! American
Golf Corporation v. Superior Court: The Continued Uneven Application of California's
Flawed Doctrine of Assumption of Risk, 29 W. ST. U. L. REv. 125 (2001) (reviewing
intrajurisdictional treatment of assumption of risk doctrine).
144. See Hess, supra note 142, at 458-59, 468 (noting approaches to apportion-
ing liability in sports vary byjurisdiction and many jurisdictions have yet to formu-
late distinct approach).
145. See Cochran, supra note 143, at 132 (stating Third Restatement of Torts
has rejected most forms of assumption of risk); Powers, supra note 3, at 772-73
(recounting mostjurisdictions abandoned assumption of risk doctrine after advent
of comparative fault, resulting in jury instructions on comparative fault principles
only, and including plaintiffs knowledge or appreciation of risk as one factor for
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the assumption of risk doctrine, despite criticism for uneven appli-
cation. 146 Jurisdictions which retain some form of assumption of
risk take a more subjective approach in determining duty than
others. 147 Ultimately, no negligence scheme should completely ab-
solve a manufacturer of liability when it has knowingly increased
the inherent risks of a sport. 148 Because injured athletes face the
additional challenge of meeting their burden of proof under
changing assumption of risk doctrines, this Note will briefly
examine the facts of Sanchez under several jurisdictional
approaches. 149
1. Objective Approach: Inherent Risk
As previously discussed, California adopted an objective analy-
sis, as delineated in Knight, focusing on whether the defendant's
consideration). The underlying reason for the abandonment of the doctrine is
that comparative fault already encompasses the doctrine; a determination of
whether a plaintiff was aware of a known risk in an activity is a necessary element in
a comparative fault analysis. See Hess, supra note 142, at 461.
146. Commentators have addressed what they perceive to be the uneven ap-
plication of California's assumption of risk doctrine. See Cochran, supra note 143
at 130-36 (noting differing application of California's assumption of risk doctrine).
The Second District Court of Appeal in Sanchez relied on the assumption of risk
scheme laid out by the court in Knight v. Jewett. See Sanchez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
535. However, scholars have noted the Knight scheme has led to uneven applica-
tion of the assumption of risk doctrine among California's appellate jurisdictions.
See Cochran, supra note 143, at 130-36.
In American Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, the plaintiff was injured when another
player's shot ricocheted off a wooden yardage marker and struck him in the eye.
See 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (restating facts of case). The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and granted a summary
judgment motion on behalf of the defendant, holding primary assumption of risk
barred the plaintiff's action, even though the plaintiff was not actually aware of the
risk imposed by the wooden markers. See id. at 685 (stating holding).
By contrast, in Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., defendant injured plaintiff
with a shot on the fourth fairway while plaintiff stood near his tee on the fifth
fairway. See 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (summarizing facts of
case). The Fourth District Court of Appeal found the golf course liable for the
golfer's injuries, despite the golfer's full knowledge and awareness of risks imposed
by the course's removal of a large pine tree that previously protected the fifth tee
area. See id. at 253; see also Cochran, supra note 143 (setting out inconsistencies
between American CGQf and Morgan, and asserting that such uneven interpretation
indicates need for elimination of assumption of risk doctrine in California).
147. For a discussion of objective and subjective approaches to duty, see infra
notes 150-71 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of appropriate imposition of liability where manufac-
turer's conduct has increased risk of injury to athlete, see supra notes 130-36 and
accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of various jurisdictional approaches to duty, see infra
notes 150-84 and accompanying text.
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conduct was an inherent risk of the sport. 150 While defendants
have no legal duty to eliminate or protect the plaintiff against risks
inherent in a sport, it is well established that defendants generally
have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to plaintiff over
and above those inherent in the sport.151 The focus on inherent
risk suggests a plaintiff's subjective knowledge or appreciation of
potential risk is not the primary focus in defining the defendant's
duty. 152 The duty analysis does not depend on the plaintiff's subjec-
tive knowledge or appreciation of the risk.153
Hawaii takes an approach similar to that of California with re-
gard to determining duty, focusing objectively on the risk presented
by the defendant's conduct.154 In determining whether the defen-
dant's conduct was an inherent risk of the sport or activity, Hawaii
considers the nature of the activity, the relationship of the defen-
dant to the activity, and the relationship of the defendant to the
150. The Knight approach was further elaborated in Bushnell v. Japanese-Ameri-
can Religious & Cultural Center, ConcordJudo Club, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 673-74 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996). Because Knight only involved a defendant who was a co-participant
in a sport, the court had occasion to consider only the standard of conduct appli-
cable to co-participants in competitive sports. See Knight, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992)
(addressing liability for injuries sustained when defendant collided with co-partici-
pant plaintiff during informal touch football game). In Bushnell, a California court
announced a general rule applicable to defendants in noncompetitive, but active,
sports. See Bushnell, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674-75. The Bushnell court stated:
General rules of liability attach when the defendant's conduct is not an
inherent risk of the activity or when the defendant's conduct increased
the inherent risks in the activity. A defendant also may be charged with
the duty to take such precautions as will prevent the risk without having a
chilling effect on the nature of the activity.
Id. at 674.
151. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 (explaining defendant's duty).
152. See Foronda ex rel. Estate of Foronda v. Haw. Int'l Boxing Club, 25 P.3d
826, 839 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001) (evaluating California's assumption of risk doctrine
and inferring plaintiff's subjective knowledge was neither exclusive nor primary
focus in duty analysis); see also Knight, 834 P.2d at 709. The Knight court noted:
Rather than being dependent on the knowledge or consent of the partic-
ular plaintiff, resolution of the question of the defendant's liability in
such cases turns on whether the defendant had a legal duty to avoid such
conduct or to protect the plaintiff against a particular risk of harm ....
[T] he nature of the defendant's duty in the sports context depends heav-
ily upon the nature of the sport itself. Additionally, the scope of the legal
duty will also depend on the defendant's role in, or relationship to, the
sport.
Id.
153. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 709 (describing objective nature of California's
duty analysis).
154. See Foronda, 25 P.3d at 841 (stating "primary implied assumption of risk is
a discrete and complete defense where the defendant's conduct at issue is an in-
herent risk of the sports activity") (footnote omitted).
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plaintiff.1 55 Under Hawaii's doctrine, "a defendant may be held lia-
ble for either creating or countenancing risks other than those in-
herent in the sport or for increasing inherent risks."'' 56 Where a
defendant's conduct creates a new risk or increases the inherent
risk of injury, a court will not apply assumption of risk to bar
relief.157
Alaska's duty analysis also focuses on the inherent risks or "nec-
essary dangers" in an activity or sport. 58 If the exercise of reasona-
ble care could mitigate or eliminate a danger, it is not a necessary
danger and is therefore not an inherent risk of the sport. 15 9
Alaska's courts have defined an unreasonable risk as one for which
"the likelihood and gravity of the harm threatened outweigh [s] the
utility of the ... conduct and the burden on the [defendant] for
removing the danger."'160
As previously discussed, a plaintiff-athlete such as Sanchez
should not be barred from pursuing an action against a negligent
manufacturer in a jurisdiction that has adopted an objective ap-
proach focusing on inherent risk. 161 Any conduct found to in-
crease the inherent risks or necessary dangers of the sport would
trigger the existence of the defendant's duty and eliminate the pri-
mary assumption of risk defense. 16 2
2. Subjective Approach: Plaintiffs Knowledge
Duty analysis in other jurisdictions necessarily involves an as-
sessment of the plaintiff's subjective knowledge or appreciation of
the risk. 163 Missouri, for example, takes a slightly more subjective
155. See id. at 836. In absence of such a defense of primary assumption of
risk, general comparative negligence principles govern the analysis. See id.
156. Id. at 841. The court went on to state liability should not place unreason-
able burdens on free and vigorous participation in the sport. See id.
157. See id. at 844 (holding in favor of defendant boxing ring operator).
158. See Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 633 (Alaska 2001) (defin-
ing inherent risks as necessary dangers that cannot be mitigated or eliminated
through exercise of reasonable care).
159. See id. (quoting Hiibschman ex rel. Welch v. City of Valdez, 821 P.2d 1354,
1360 n.12 (Alaska 1991)).
160. See id. (relying on State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 725 (Alaska 1972)).
161. For a discussion of a plaintiff-athlete's potential negligence claims in
such a jurisdiction, see supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation Dist., 642 N.W.2d 864,
871 (N.D. 2002) (holding, in North Dakota, voluntary participants in sporting ac-
tivities are presumed to have consented to injury-causing events as known, appar-
ent, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of participation).
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approach to duty.164 While the basis of primary assumption of risk
is the plaintiff's consent to accept the risk, the plaintiff must be
aware of the facts that create the danger and appreciate the danger
itself.165 The Missouri approach focuses on "what the particular
plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands, and appreciates."' 166
To invoke the defense of primary assumption of risk in Wash-
ington, "the evidence must show that the plaintiff (1) had full sub-
jective understanding (2) of the presence and nature of the specific
risk and (3) voluntarily chose to encounter the risk."'167 Thus,
Washington's duty assessment also incorporates the plaintiffs sub-
jective knowledge and appreciation of the inherent risks of the
sport. 168
In a jurisdiction adopting this more subjective approach, a
plaintiff-athlete similar to Sanchez should not be barred from pur-
suing action for relief by the primary assumption of risk defense.
Such a plaintiff may argue that the manufacturer unreasonably in-
creased the risks of injury through its design of equipment and
such risks were not obvious or apparent to the plaintiff.169 A plain-
tiff may also argue a lack of understanding of the nature and scope
of the additional risks presented by new equipment designs.170 To
further support an assertion that increased risks were not apparent
or were concealed, a plaintiff like Sanchez might rely on repeated
manufacturer assurances that newer designs of equipment
presented no increased risk of injury to participants.?71
164. See, e.g., Lewis v. Snow Creek, Inc., 6 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). If
the risks of the activity are perfectly obvious or fully comprehended, then plaintiff
has consented to them, and defendant has performed his or her duty. See id. at
395-96.
165. See id. at 396 (explaining subjective nature of Missouri's duty analysis).
166. See id. (quoting Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R1 School Dist., 904
S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
167. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 984 P.2d 448, 450 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(delineating evidential burden to establish primary assumption of risk). "The par-
ticipant must know that the risk is present, and he or she must further understand
its nature; and... his or her choice to incur it must be free and voluntary." See id.
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 at
487 (5th ed. 1984)) (brackets omitted).
168. See id. at 450-51 (setting forth Washington's approach to duty).
169. See Lewis, 6 S.W.3d at 396 (basing determination of plaintiff's knowledge
of inherent risks on basis of what plaintiff actually sees, knows, understands, and
appreciates).
170. See Brown, 984 P.2d at 450 (requiring plaintiffs understanding of pres-
ence and nature of risk for assumption of risk to bar relief).
171. See Lewis, 6 S.W.3d at 396 (requiring plaintiff must be aware of facts that
create the danger and appreciate danger itself); see also Lombardi, supra note 14
(reporting repeated manufacturer assurances that newly designed aluminum bats
did not increase safety risks to players).
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3. Other Approaches
Some jurisdictions consider both subjective and objective fac-
tors in determining the existence of duty. In New York's compara-
tive fault regime, "assumption of risk is not an absolute defense" in
a negligence action "but [rather] a measure of the defendant's duty
of care.' 72 Under this approach, the court will measure the plain-
tiffs knowledge of risk against the background of the skill and ex-
perience of the particular plaintiff.173 If the risks of the activity are
fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, and the participant has
consented to them, then the defendant has no duty of care with
regard to these risks. 174 Participants are not deemed to have con-
sented to unassumed risks or risks that have been concealed or un-
reasonably increased.' 75 Thus, the existence of a defendant's duty
of care necessarily relates to (1) a plaintiffs ability to comprehend
the risks, and (2) his or her actual comprehension of the risks. 176
Indiana takes a similar approach.' 77 Under Indiana doctrine, a
sports participant owes no duty of care to a co-participant with re-
172. See Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1997).
173. See id. at 208. The court elaborated: "Correspondingly, for purposes of
determining the extent of the threshold duty of care, knowledge plays a role but
inherency is the sine qua non.. . ." Id. (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 207 (stating by engaging in sport, participants consent to those
commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and generally arise out of na-
ture of sport and flow from such participation).
175. See id. at 208 (stating participant in recreational activity will not be
deemed to have assumed unreasonably increased or concealed risks); see also
Ruepp v. W. Experience, Inc., 706 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting
hazard concealed or unreasonably increased is not within range of risks assumed
by participant in sporting activity); Karr v. Brant Lake Camp, Inc., 691 N.Y.S.2d
427, 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding voluntary participants in sporting activities
assume risks to which their roles expose them, but not risks unreasonably in-
creased); Hawley v. Binghamton Mets Baseball Club, Inc., 691 N.Y.S.2d 626, 627-28
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding sports participants assume risk of injuries normally
associated with sport, unless conditions caused by defendant's negligence were
unique and created dangerous condition over and above usual dangers inherent
in sport).
176. See Taylor v. Massapequa Int'l Little League, 689 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (stating defendant may be relieved from liability for injuries to
plaintiff-participant in sport arising from inherent risks when consenting partici-
pant aware of risks, has appreciation of nature of risks, and voluntarily assumes
risks).
177. See, e.g., Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (describing
Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, intended to ameliorate harshness of common law
contributory negligence, as precluding a slightly negligent plaintiff from recover-
ing damages, even against highly culpable tortfeasor). Under the Act, courts per-
mit plaintiffs to recover damages, reducing them in proportion to plaintiff's fault.
See id. However, if a court finds the plaintiff to be more than 50 percent at fault,
plaintiffis recovery is completely barred. See id. As a result, Indiana courts will
consider plaintiffs subjective knowledge in determining fault, but will also con-
sider objective factors or reasonableness. See id.
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spect to risks that are considered to be within the ordinary range of
activity involved in the sport.178 Under this approach, the plaintiff's
knowledge of risks receives some consideration, but the inherency
of the risk in the sport weighs far more heavily.' 7 9 Indiana takes
this slightly more objective approach based on "the policy-driven
concept that flows from the legal relationship of the participants in
a sport, not their subjective expectations."' 80
New Hampshire does not recognize implied assumption of risk
at all. 181 As a matter of law, participants in certain sports do not
assume the dangers inherent in those sports unless they are sports
for which the state legislature has explicitly provided. 182 Under
such an approach a plaintiff-athlete like Sanchez would not face the
initial obstacle of defeating a primary assumption of risk defense. 183
However, an obstacle may exist in that for certain sports, legislative
assessment of the inherent dangers of a sport would not be subject
to argument or interpretation. 184
V. IMPACT OF SANCHEZ V. HILLERICH & BRADSBY Co.
A. Athletic Organizations
Commentators have stated the California appellate court's de-
cision to allow Sanchez's action does not state a remarkable new
principle of law. 18 5 Nonetheless, the decision seems to extend lia-
bility for injuries associated with newly designed sports equipment
178. See id. at 414 (assessing duty of care between co-participants). While the
Indiana Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the standard of care be-
tween co-participants in athletic events, it had addressed the appropriate standard
of care owed by an educational institution and its representatives to students for
injuries sustained while playing campus sports. See id.
179. See id. at 418 (explaining that for purposes of determining whether pri-
mary assumption of risk doctrine applies, plaintiff's knowledge plays role, but in-
herency of risks involved in particular sport is sine qua non).
180. See id.
181. See Dean v. MacDonald, 786 A.2d 834, 840 (N.H. 2001) (holding state
common law no longer recognized implied assumption of risk as defense to negli-
gence claims arising from sporting events).
182. See Hacking v. Town of Belmont, 736 A.2d 1229, 1234 (N.H. 1999) (stat-
ing participants do not assume, as matter of law, dangers inherent in any sport
unless explicitly provided by legislature).
183. See Dean, 786 A.2d at 840.
184. See id.
185. See Mike McKee, Bat Ups Chance of Baseball Injuries Appeals Court Rules, at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1039054489023 (Dec. 24, 2002) (quoting
attorney, Wendy Lascher, as stating, "the [Second] District's ruling isn't that novel
.... It's not stating a remarkable new principle of law... just applying law that's
in effect.").
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to the athletic organizations regulating competition. 18 6 As one
commentator has noted, "any piece of sports equipment that makes
the game more dangerous than its very nature will impose the risk
of liability on the institution behind a team or player. 1i 7 Others
are skeptical that Sanchez's action will be met with success.188 Re-
gardless of the outcome, Sanchez's case has inevitably brought at-
tention to the increased risks that may accompany newer
generations of high-performance equipment. Sanchez's case has
also increased awareness on the part of perhaps the most pivotal
party to this issue - the governing athletic organizations who are
committed to player safety and ultimately responsible for sanction-
ing equipment.
B. Sports Equipment Manufacturers
In the context of athletic competition, courts have extended a
duty of care to a wide range of defendants whose actions have in-
creased the inherent risks of a sport, including coaches, instructors,
co-participants, governing organizations, and sports facility owners
and operators. 89 The outcome of Sanchez may support proper ap-
plication of that duty of care to sports equipment manufacturers as
well.190 A finding of liability on the part of Hillerich & Bradsby may
influence manufacturers to reevaluate their commitment to player
safety. Sanchez's preliminary success in defeating these summary
judgment motions reinforces the conclusion that where a defen-
dant's conduct may have increased the inherent risks of a sport,
186. See id. (quoting California attorney's assessment of possible weight of
outcome). "The court's ruling, carried to its logical conclusion, could apply to all
new equipment - golf clubs, hockey sticks, tennis rackets and more - that
change the nature of games by increasing the risk of injuries." Id.
187. Id. (stating ruling would potentially apply to any kind of equipment).
188. See id. (quoting Mark Eisenhut, NCAA's representative in suit, asserting
his confidence NCAA can demonstrate it acted in best interest of all players at time
of Sanchez's injury).
189. See Rosania v. Carmona, 706 A.2d 191, 196 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998)
(holding karate coaches owe duty to communicate unambiguously applicable rules
of engagement and avoid negligently violating such rules); Superskate, Inc. v. No-
len by Miller, 641 So.2d 231, 235 (Ala. 1994) (finding skating rink owner owes duty
of care to skaters to adequately supervise the rink and prevent skating surface from
becoming overcrowded); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 705 (Cal. 1992) (holding
duty of care owed by co-participant not to intentionally injure another player and
not to compete with aggressive conduct falling outside of normal range associated
with sport); Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270, 274 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding riding instructor owed duty of care not to increase jumps
beyond skill of rider); Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 398
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding duty of care owed by sports facility operator not to
incorporate jumps that present extreme risk of injury).
190. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 705 (Cal. 1992) (stating holding).
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facile reliance on the primary assumption of risk defense should
not automatically bar a plaintiff-athlete's relief. 91
Amanda M. Winfree
191. See Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 541 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (stating court of appeal's decision to reinstate Sanchez's action).
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